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ABSTRACT
Progress in mobile wireless technology has resulted in the
increased use of mobile devices to store and manage users’
personal schedules. Users also access popular context-based
services, typically provided by third-party providers, by us-
ing these devices for social networking, dating and activity-
partner searching applications. Very often, these applica-
tions need to determine common availabilities among a set
of user schedules. The privacy of the scheduling operation is
paramount to the success of such applications, as often users
do not want to share their personal schedules with other
users or third-parties. Previous research has resulted in so-
lutions that provide privacy guarantees, but they are either
too complex or do not fit well in the popular user-provider
operational model. In this paper, we propose practical and
privacy-preserving solutions to the server-based scheduling
problem. Our novel algorithms take advantage of the homo-
morphic properties of well-known cryptosystems in order to
privately compute common user availabilities. We also for-
mally outline the privacy requirements in such scheduling
applications and we implement our solutions on real mobile
devices. The experimental measurements and analytical re-
sults show that the proposed solutions not only satisfy the
privacy properties but also fare better, in regard to com-
putation and communication efficiency, compared to other
well-known solutions.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.4 [Distributed Systems]: Client/server; K.4.1 [Public
Policy Issues]: Privacy
General Terms
Algorithms, Design, Performance, Security
Keywords
Activity scheduling, Client-server architecture, Homomor-
phic encryption
1. INTRODUCTION
Users rely increasingly on mobile devices such as smart-
phones and netbooks to access information while on the
move [7], and very often they use the same equipment to
store personal information about their daily schedules and
activities [2]. Although many context and data sharing ap-
plications such as Google Maps, Facebook and Twitter are
popular, activity management and synchronization applica-
tions are also gaining more and more attention [4]. Applica-
tions such as Microsoft Outlook [5], Apple iCal [1] and Nokia
Ovi [6] are available on mobile devices and they all offer time
and activity management services. One desirable feature
in such applications is activity scheduling : colleagues can
schedule meetings at common available time slots, groups of
friends can organize parties on weekends and people unbe-
knownst to each other can engage in dating based on their
common free/busy hours.
One concern in such scheduling applications is that users
would prefer not to share all personal information with ev-
eryone. For example, they may only want to share common
availabilities, but not details about other records. They may
also have reservations about sharing personal information
with third-party service providers. Therefore, privacy of
personal information, vis-a`-vis service providers and peers,
is paramount for the success of such scheduling applications.
For instance, a well-known service that allows users to find
all common availabilities is Doodle [3]. However, Doodle
does not provide privacy: Each user and the doodle server
see the free/busy state of every user, and the private in-
formation that is leaked to all users and the central server
is well beyond just the common available slots. Cultural,
religious and many other private information can be eas-
ily inferred from availability patterns. Even if pseudonyms
are used instead of real names, the server and all peers still
know what time slots are available for everyone and how
many users are free or busy.
Privacy-preserving scheduling problems have been exten-
sively studied in the past by researchers from the theoretical
perspective, for instance, by modeling them as set inter-
section problems [20, 11], distributed constraint satisfaction
problems [27, 28, 24, 25], secure multi-party computation
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problems [18, 12] and by framing them in the e-voting con-
text [19]. Traditionally, there are two possible approaches to
the scheduling problems: distributed and centralized. Dis-
tributed solutions do not rely on a third-party provider (and
thus they prevent revealing information to the provider),
but have several limitations. For instance, due to the fre-
quent and intensive message exchanges among peers, scala-
bility and computational complexity is an issue when deal-
ing with a large number of (resource-limited) mobile devices;
moreover, the need of sequencing among peers and the un-
predictability of scheduling results (if a user interrupts the
protocol) are two additional drawbacks. The centralized
approaches, such as cloud-based computing, are better in
terms of scalability, communication cost, complexity, syn-
chronization and resilience but usually do not provide pri-
vacy, because users are required to transmit their personal
information to the provider.
Our goal is to provide simple, practical and feasible solutions
to the scheduling problem which, in addition to ensuring rea-
sonable privacy guarantees, are easily integrated with exist-
ing operational models and mobile service providers. In this
paper, we follow a centralized approach for addressing the
problem of efficient and privacy-preserving scheduling. In
the proposed schemes, users are able to determine common
time slots without revealing any other information to either
the other participants or to the central scheduling server.
Our specific contributions are as follows. First, by building
on the work of authors in related domains, we formally de-
fine the basic privacy requirements for users in a scheduling
scenario. Second, we propose three novel privacy-preserving
scheduling algorithms that take advantage of the homomor-
phic properties of asymmetric cryptosystems. Third, we im-
plement the proposed algorithms on real mobile devices and
perform extensive experiments using these devices in order
to verify their computation and communication overheads.
Finally, we explain how the system can be further made
resilient to collusion and other well-known active attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, we believe this is the first
implementation and extensive testing of privacy-preserving
scheduling schemes on commercial mobile devices.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the state-
of-the-art in Section 2 and the system model and problem
definition in Section 3. We formalize the privacy require-
ments for the scheduling problem in Section 4 and outline
our algorithms in sections 5, 6 and 7. We present a compar-
ative analysis and implementation results in Section 8, and
we discuss the extensions of our schemes in Section 9. We
conclude the paper in Section 10.
2. STATE OF THE ART
In the literature, the four most relevant bodies of work
that address privacy in scheduling or similar scenarios are
based on techniques from private set-intersection [20, 11],
distributed constraint satisfaction [27, 28, 24, 25], secure
multi-party computation [18, 12] and e-voting [19]. Here-
after, we review the most relevant aspects of such approaches.
In the private set-intersection domain, Kissner and Song [20]
use mathematic properties of polynomials to design privacy-
preserving union, intersection and element reduction opera-
tions on private multisets by leveraging on the Goldwasser-
Micali homomorphic encryption scheme [17]. De Cristofaro
and Tsudik [11] provide efficient variations of private-set in-
tersection protocols and present a comparison in terms of
computational and communication complexity, adversarial
model and privacy. The authors also give informal defini-
tions of client and server privacy. However, PSI approaches
are generally distributed, and an efficient extension to an
n-party protocol is challenging. In the meeting scheduling
scenario, for instance, a trivial extension of the 2-party PSI
to n parties (by running a 2-party protocol between each pair
of users) would undermine the privacy of users’ schedules as
well; knowing the personal availability and the aggregate
availability is sufficient to infer the other party’s schedule.
Distributed constraint satisfaction approaches were investi-
gated by Wallace and Freuder [27]: they study the tradeoff
between privacy and efficiency and show that the informa-
tion that entities learn during the negotiation of a common
schedule has, in some cases, a tremendous impact on privacy.
Details of an accept/reject response are exploited by intel-
ligent agents in order to successfully infer the availabilities
of other peers involved in the scheduling process. Similarly,
Zunino and Campo [29] design a scheduling system in which
entities learn and refine their knowledge about user prefer-
ences by using a Bayesian network. Yokoo et al. [28] use se-
cret sharing among third-party servers in order to determine
a suitable agreement among entities in a collusion-resistant
way.
Solutions based on secure multi-party computation were in-
vestigated in [12] and a practical scheme was proposed in
[18]. Herlea et al. [18], for instance, design and evaluate a
distributed secure scheduling protocol by relying on proper-
ties of the XOR operation over binary values, in which all
users contribute to the secrecy of individual schedules while
ensuring the correctness of the results. Although not a pure
e-voting scheme, Kellerman and Bo¨hme [19] proposed an
event scheduling protocol that inherits several security and
privacy requirements from the e-voting context. However,
a formal study of such properties and experimental perfor-
mance results are missing in their work.
In contrast to most of the above solutions, we take a more
centralized approach (with a single third-party server) for
the privacy-preserving scheduling problem. Our solutions
overcome communication and computational complexities
intrinsic to most distributed approaches discussed above,
as well as ensure that no private information (other than
the resulting common availabilities) is exposed. Moreover,
our protocols can easily fit into today’s popular provider-
consumer service architectures without incurring a huge com-
munication cost on the service-provider.
3. SYSTEMMODEL
In this section, we outline the network and adversary model
and formally define the scheduling problem.
3.1 Network Model
We assume that there is a total of N users ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N},
that want to schedule an activity (meeting, party) at a com-
mon available time slot. Each user has a private schedule
xi represented by a string of bits xi = [bi,1, bi,2, . . . , bi,m],
where each bit bi,j ∈ {0, 1} expresses the availability of user
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ui in a particular time slot j; bi,j = 1 means that user ui
is available at time slot j, whereas bi,j = 0 means that the
user is not available.1 We assume that the length m of xi,
i.e. the time horizon of the individual schedules, is constant
for all users. The value of m can either be predecided by
the participants or fixed by the application.
Moreover, we assume that each user’s device is able to per-
form public key cryptographic operations and that there is
a semi-honest [16] (as detailed in Section 3.2) third-party
performing the scheduling computations. The latter must
be able to communicate with the users and run public key
cryptographic functions as well. For instance, a common
public-key infrastructure using the RSA [23] cryptosystem
could be employed. All communications between a user and
the third-party server will be encrypted with the latter’s
public key for the purposes of confidentiality of the schedules
with respect to other users, for authentication and integrity
protection. Thus, all users know the public key of the server
but nobody, except the server, knows the corresponding pri-
vate key. For simplicity of exposition, in our algorithms we
do not explicitly show the cryptographic operations involv-
ing the server’s public/private key.
We assume that the N users share a common secret, which is
used to derive (i) a fresh common key pair (KP ,Ks), where
Kp is the public key andKs is the private key, and (ii) a fresh
bit permutation function σ = [σ1, . . . , σm] before initiating
the scheduling operation. This could be achieved, for exam-
ple, through a secure credential establishment protocol [9,
10, 21]. Thus, these keys and permutations are derived and
known to each member of the group but not to the server.
We refer to the encryption of a message M with the group
public key as EKP ,r(M) = C, where r is a random integer
that is eventually needed, and to the decryption of the en-
crypted message C as DKs(C) = M . The permutation σ,
although not strictly required, is used in order to randomize
the order of bits sent to the server. This prevents the server
from gaining any knowledge about which time slot is being
evaluated in each computation.
3.2 Adversarial Model
Server
The third-party server is assumed to execute the scheduling
protocols correctly, but it tries to learn any information it
can from the input it gets by the users and the computations
it performs. The server can accumulate the knowledge about
users in each computation it performs. We refer to this
adversarial behavior as semi-honest. More details about the
semi-honest model can be found in [16].
Users
Users also want to learn private information about other
users’ schedules and, in addition to the passive eavesdrop-
ping attacks, users could act maliciously by generating fake
1In general, however, users may assign not only a binary
value (available or busy) for each time slot, but they could
express preferences [14, 15]. For example, bi,j ∈ 0, . . . , 10
where bi,j = 0 means that user ui is busy in the time slot
j, whereas its preference would increase if bi,j ≥ 1. For
simplicity of exposition, we assume a binary value here. We
later discuss a more general case with non-binary costs in
Section 9.
users, manipulating their own schedules or by colluding with
other users or the scheduling server. Initially, we assume
that users are honest but curious (or semi-honest), and af-
terwards we present more active (or malicious) types of user
adversaries in Section 9.2.
Although the semi-honest adversarial model is sufficient in
most practical settings, considering the commercial inter-
est of service providers and the mutual trust among partici-
pants, it does not include possible malicious behavior by the
server or users. For instance, the server could collude with
the participants or generate fake participants in order to ob-
tain private information of the participants. Similarly, users
might collude with other users or try to maliciously modify
their schedules in order to disrupt the execution of the proto-
col or to gain information about other users’ schedules. We
address such active attacks by both users and server in Sec-
tion 9.2, and we describe how such attacks can be thwarted
by using existing cryptographic mechanisms.
3.3 Centralized Scheduling Algorithm
Given a group of N users ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N}, each with private
schedules xi = [bi,1, . . . , bi,m], the scheduling problem is to
find time slots j such that ∀i = 1 . . . N , bi,j = 1, i.e. all
users are available in the same time slot j. We refer to an
algorithm that solves the scheduling problem as a scheduling
algorithm. Formally, a scheduling algorithm A accepts the
following inputs and produces the respective outputs:
• Input: a transformation of individual schedules
f(bi,1, . . . , bi,m), ∀i = 1 . . . N.
where f is a transformation function such that it is
hard (success with only a negligible probability) to de-
termine the input of the function by just observing the
output.
• Output: a function g(Y ), Y = y1, . . . , yj , . . . , ym where:
yj =
{
Y ES if bi,j = 1, ∀i = 1 . . . N
NO otherwise
such that each user is able to compute Y = g−1(g(Y )) using
its local data. As we will see later on, we use the well-known
cryptosytems ElGamal [13], Paillier [22] and Goldwasser-
Micali [17] as our transformation and output functions f
and g.
A centralized scheduling process works as follows. Each user
ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N} computes fi = f(bi,1, . . . , bi,m) and sends it
to the third-party server, which then executes the scheduling
algorithm A on the received inputs fi, ∀i, and produces
g(Y ) = A(f1, . . . , fN ). Finally, the server sends g(Y ) to
each user who then obtains Y = g−1(g(Y )). Figure 1 shows
one execution of a generic centralized scheduling process.
4. PRIVACY DEFINITIONS
As mentioned earlier, in this paper we follow a centralized
approach to solve the privacy-preserving scheduling prob-
lem. In other words, we assume that a third-party, given
users’ individual private schedules, computes their common
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Figure 1: A generic scheduling protocol. Users first send their transformed schedules fi to the server, which
then performs the scheduling algorithm A on the received data and sends the encrypted output g(Y ) back to
each user.
availabilities (time slots). /The privacy provided by a cen-
tralized scheduling algorithm can be defined in terms of the
following two components: a) User-privacy and b) Server-
privacy. Hereafter, we formally define each of these compo-
nents. The symbols used throughout the paper are summa-
rized in Table 1.
User-privacy
The user-privacy of any centralized scheduling algorithm A
measures the probabilistic advantage that any user ui, i ∈
{1 . . . N} gains towards learning the private schedules of at
least one other user uj , j 6= i, except their common avail-
abilities, after all users have participated in the execution
of the algorithm A. In order to accurately measure users’
privacy, we need to compute the following two advantages.
First, we measure the Identifiability Advantage, which is the
probabilistic advantage of an adversary in correctly guessing
a schedule bit (which is not a common availability) of any
other user. We denote it as AdvIDTui (A). Second, we measure
the Linkability Advantage, which is the probabilistic advan-
tage of an adversary in correctly guessing that any two or
more other users have exactly the same corresponding sched-
ule bit (not a common availability bit) without necessarily
knowing the values of those bits. We denote this advantage
as AdvLNKui (A). We make the following straightforward ob-
servation.
Observation 1. If an adversary has identifiability advan-
tage over two corresponding schedule bits of two different
users, this implies that it has linkability advantage over those
two bits as well. However, the inverse is not necessarily true.
We semantically define the identifiability and linkability ad-
vantages using a challenge-response methodology. Challenge-
response games have been widely used in cryptography to
prove the security of cryptographic protocols. We now de-
scribe such a challenge-response game for the identifiability
advantage AdvIDTui (A) of any user ui participating in the
algorithm A as follows.
1. Initialization: Challenger privately collects
xi = [bi,1, . . . , bi,m] and fi = f(bi,1, . . . , bi,m) from all
users ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N}.
Table 1: Table of symbols.
SYMBOL DEFINITION 
( )LNKAdv A  Linkability advantage 
( )IDTAdv A  Identifiability advantage 
D (C) Decryption of a ciphertext C 
EK,r (m) 
Encryption of a message m using the key K and 
a random number r 
KP Shared public key of the N users 
KS Shared private key of the N users 
m Number of slots of each individual schedule 
N Number of users 
xi=[bi,1,..,bi,m] 
Schedule of user ui, where bi,j is the availability 
at time slot j 
1[ ,.. ], m    Schedule permutation function 
 
 
2. Scheduling: Challenger computes g(Y ) = A(f1, f2, . . . , fN )
with the users and sends g(Y ) to all users u1, u2, . . . , uN .
3. Challenger randomly picks a user ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N}, as
the adversary.
4. ui picks j ∈ {1 . . . N}, s.t. j 6= i and sends it to the
challenger.
5. Challenge: the challenger picks a random time slot p ∈
{1 . . .m}, s.t., ∃bk,p = 0 for at least one k ∈ 1, . . . , N .
Challenger then sends (j, p) to the user ui. This is the
challenge.
6. Guess: User ui sends b
′
j,p ∈ {0, 1} to the challenger as
a response to his challenge. If b′j,p = bj,p, the user ui
(adversary) wins; otherwise, he loses.
The identifiability advantage AdvIDTui (A) can be defined as
AdvIDTui (A) =
∣∣∣∣Prui [b′j,p = bj,p]− 12
∣∣∣∣ (1)
where Prui [b
′
j,p = bj,p] is the probability of user ui winning
the game (correctly answering the challenge in the challenge-
response game), computed over the coin flips of the chal-
lenger, b′j,p is ui’s guess about the schedule of user uj in
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the time slot p and bj,p is uj ’s true availability. An external
attacker, having no access to the output of the algorithm,
has obviously no advantage at all. Thus, we focus on the
non-trivial case with participating users only.
Similarly, we describe the challenge-response game for the
linkability advantage AdvLNKui (A) of any user ui as follows.
1. Initialization: Challenger privately collects
xi = [bi,1, . . . , bi,m] and fi = f(bi,1, . . . , bi,m) from all
users ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N}.
2. Scheduling: Challenger computes g(Y ) = A(f1, f2, . . . , fN )
with the users and sends g(Y ) to all users u1, u2, . . . , uN .
3. Challenger randomly picks a user ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N}, as
the adversary.
4. ui picks h, j ∈ {1 . . . N}, s.t. j 6= h, j 6= i, h 6= i and
sends (h, j) to the challenger.
5. Challenge: Challenger randomly picks a time slot p ∈
{1 . . .m}, s.t., ∃bk,p = 0 for at least one k ∈ 1, . . . , N .
Challenger then sends (j, p) and (h, p) to the user ui.
This is the challenge.
6. Guess: User ui decides if bj,p = bh,p or not. User ui
sets b′ = 1 if he decides bj,p = bh,p and b′ = 0 if he
decides bj,p 6= bh,p. User ui sends b′ to the challenger
as a response to his challenge. If bj,p = bh,p and b
′ = 1
or if bj,p 6= bh,p and b′ = 0, the user ui (adversary)
wins; otherwise, he loses.
The linkability advantage AdvLNKui (A) can be defined as
AdvLNKui (A) = |Prui [((bj,p = bh,p) ∧ b′ = 1)
∨ ((bj,p 6= bh,p) ∧ b′ = 0)]− 1
2
| (2)
where Prui [.] is the probability of user ui winning the game,
computed over the coin flips of the challenger. As for the
identifiability advantage, an external attacker has no linka-
bility advantage at all.
We now define the user-privacy of the scheduling algorithm
A on a per-execution basis as follows:
Definition 1. An execution of the centralized scheduling
algorithm A is user-private if both the identifiability advan-
tage AdvIDTui (A) and the linkability advantage Adv
LNK
ui (A)
of each participating user ui, i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is negligible.
A function f(x) is called negligible if, for any positive poly-
nomial p(x), there is an integer B such that for any integer
x > B, f(x) < 1/p(x) [16].
Definition 1 says that a particular execution of the schedul-
ing algorithm is user-private if and only if users do not gain
any (actually, negligible) additional knowledge about the
schedule bits of any other user, except the schedule bits that
have a value 1 for all users (common availabilities).
Server-privacy
The server-privacy of any (centralized) scheduling algorithm
Ameasures the probabilistic advantage that the server (which
executes the scheduling algorithm A and observes the inputs
from the users) gains towards learning the private schedules
of at least one user ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N}. As in the case of user-
privacy, we need to compute the following two advantages.
First, the advantage of the server in guessing correctly any
schedule bit of any user participating in the scheduling al-
gorithm, called as Identifiability Advantage and denoted as
AdvIDTS (A). Second, the advantage of the server in guess-
ing correctly that any two (or more) participating users have
exactly the same corresponding schedule bits without neces-
sarily knowing the values of those bits, called the Linkability
Advantage and denoted as AdvLNKS (A).
The server identifiability and linkability advantages are de-
fined in a similar fashion as the user advantages. The challenge-
response game for the server identifiability advantageAdvIDTS (A)
is defined as follows.
1. Initialization: Challenger privately collects
xi = [bi,1, . . . , bi,m] and the server privately collects
fi = f(bi,1, . . . , bi,m) from all users ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N}.
2. Scheduling: Server computes g(Y ) = A(f1, f2, . . . , fN )
with the users and sends g(Y ) to all users u1, u2, . . . , uN .
3. Server picks i ∈ {1 . . . N} and sends it to the chal-
lenger.
4. Challenge: Challenger randomly picks a time slot p ∈
{1 . . .m}. Challenger then sends (i, p) to the server.
This is the challenge.
5. Guess: server sends b′i,p ∈ {0, 1} to the challenger as
a response to his challenge. If b′i,p = bi,p, the server
(adversary) wins; otherwise, he loses.
The identifiability advantage AdvIDTS (A) is defined as
AdvIDTS (A) =
∣∣∣∣PrS [b′j,p = bj,p]− 12
∣∣∣∣ (3)
where PrS [b
′
j,p = bj,p] is the probability of the server win-
ning the game, computed over the coin flips of the challenger.
The challenge-response game for the server linkability ad-
vantage AdvLNKS (A) is defined as follows.
1. Initialization: Challenger privately collects
xi = [bi,1, . . . , bi,m] and the server privately collects
fi = f(bi,1, . . . , bi,m) from all users ui, i ∈ {1 . . . N}.
2. Scheduling: Server computes g(Y ) = A(f1, f2, . . . , fN )
with the users and sends g(Y ) to all users u1, u2, . . . , uN .
3. Server picks h, j ∈ {1 . . . N}, s.t. j 6= h and sends
(h, j) to the challenger.
4. Challenge: Challenger randomly picks p ∈ {1 . . .m}
and then sends (j, p) and (h, p) to the server. This is
the challenge.
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5. Guess: Server decides if bj,p = bh,p or not. Server
sets b′ = 1 if he decides bj,p = bh,p and b′ = 0 if he
decides bj,p 6= bh,p. Server sends b′ to the challenger as
a response to his challenge. If bj,p = bh,p and b
′ = 1 or
if bj,p 6= bh,p and b′ = 0, the server (adversary) wins;
otherwise, he loses.
The linkability advantage AdvLNKS (A) is defined as
AdvLNKS (A) = |PrS [(bj,p = bh,p) ∧ b′ = 1)
∨ (bj,p 6= bh,p) ∧ b′ = 0)]− 1
2
| (4)
where PrS [.] is the probability of the server winning the
game, computed over the coin flips of the challenger.
The server-privacy of the scheduling algorithm A on a per-
execution basis can then be defined as follows:
Definition 2. An execution of the centralized scheduling
algorithm A is server-private if both the identifiability ad-
vantageAdvIDTS (A) and the linkability advantageAdv
LNK
S (A)
of the server is negligible.
Now, it is reasonable to assume that in practice users will be
able to perform multiple executions of the scheduling algo-
rithm with possibly different participating sets of users. This
is especially true if such an algorithm is offered, for example,
as a service by mobile service providers to their subscribers.
Thus, privacy of the scheduling algorithm should be defined
over multiple executions. First, we define a private execution
as follows:
Definition 3. A private execution is an execution which
does not reveal more information than what can be derived
from its result and the prior knowledge.
Based on how memory is retained over sequential execu-
tions, we define two types of algorithm executions, namely,
independent and dependent:
Definition 4. An independent (respectively, dependent) ex-
ecution is a single private execution of the scheduling algo-
rithm defined in Section 3.3 in which no (respectively, some)
information of an earlier and current execution is retained
and passed to future execution.
The information retained can include past inputs to the algo-
rithm, intermediate results (on the server) and the outputs
of the algorithm. Based on the type of executions, we define
a privacy-preserving scheduling algorithm as follows:
Definition 5. A scheduling algorithm A is execution (re-
spectively fully) privacy-preserving if and only if for every
independent (respectively all) execution(s):
1. A is correct; All users are correctly able to compute
yj = 1, ∀j = 1 . . .m if and only if bi,j = 1, ∀i = 1 . . . N .
2. A is user-private in every execution.
3. A is server-private in every execution.
A fully privacy-preserving algorithm is a much stronger (and
difficult to achieve) privacy requirement. In this work, simi-
lar to earlier efforts, we focus on achieving execution privacy.
The following observation gives the relationship between
fully privacy-preserving and execution privacy-preserving schedul-
ing algorithms.
Observation 2. Any scheduling algorithm A, as defined
in Section 3.3, is execution privacy-preserving if it is fully
privacy-preserving, but the inverse is not true.
Next, we outline our centralized scheduling algorithms.
5. SCHEDELG ALGORITHM
In this section, we describe our first privacy-preserving cen-
tralized scheduling scheme, which is based on the ElGamal
[13] cryptosystem. The security of the ElGamal encryption
relies on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem
(DLP), which assumes that it is computationally infeasible
to obtain the private key Ks given the public key (g, h),
where g is a generator of a multiplicative cyclic group G of
prime order q and h = gKs mod q.
Our protocol SchedElG uses the homomorphic property of
the ElGamal cryptosystem in order to allow the scheduling
server to compute the aggregated availabilities by working
only on the encrypted individual schedules. For instance, it
can be verified that the ElGamal scheme satisfies:
D(EKP ,r1(m1) · EKP ,r2(m2)) =
D((gr1 ,m1h
r1) · (gr2 ,m2hr2)) =
D(gr, (m1 ·m2)hr) = m1 ·m2
where r = r1+r2 ∈ Zq is a random integer. Moreover, being
a probabilistic encryption scheme, it follows that if r1 6= r2,
EKP ,r1(m) 6= EKP ,r2(m).
For the SchedElG algorithm, we assume that the meeting
participants represent their availabilities in the following
way: b∗i,j = 1 if bi,j = 1, but b
∗
i,j = R (where R ∈ Zq, R > 1
is a random integer) if bi,j = 0.
Scheme
The privacy-preserving scheduling protocol SchedElG is shown
in Figure 2. All users first select the sequence of time slots
according to the permutation σ, i.e., σj , ∀j = 1..m, and then
encrypt individually the corresponding schedule availabili-
ties, i.e., Ei = [Ei,σ1 , . . . , Ei,σm ] where Ei,σj = EKP ,ri,j (b
∗
i,σj ).
Then, each user sends its Ei privately to the scheduling
server that performs the multiplication
∏N
i=1Ei,σj of all
users’ encrypted schedules Ei,σj , for j = 1, . . . ,m. The re-
sults of such operation are the (encrypted) aggregated avail-
abilities of all users for each time slot j. Next, the server
replies with the aggregated encrypted result Esched back to
each user. Each slot in Esched contains a product of the in-
dividual time-slot bits encrypted with the users’ shared key.
Finally, each user decrypts the result and obtains the aggre-
gated availabilities [y1 = B∗σ1 , . . . , y
m = B∗σm ] of all users ui
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of an adversary.
for each time slot σj . If B
∗
σj = 1, it means that all users
are available at time slot σj ; if B
∗
σj > 1, then at least one
user is not available and therefore σj is not a suitable time
slot. The following result shows the correctness and privacy
properties of SchedElG.
Lemma 1. The protocol SchedElG is correct and execu-
tion privacy-preserving.
Due to space constraints, we omit the proof of Lemma 1
here. Interested readers can find the proof in the full paper
[8]. In Figure 3, we plotted the identifiability and linkabil-
ity advantages of an adversary for SchedElg, compared with
polynomially (in terms of the number of participants N) de-
creasing functions p(N), for increasing values of N . As con-
firmed by our analysis, the plot shows that there is always
an integer N such that for any integer x > N , the identi-
fiability and linkability advantages are smaller than 1/p(x).
6. SCHEDPA ALGORITHM
In this section, we define our second privacy-preserving schedul-
ing scheme, which is based on the Paillier cryptosystem [22].
The security of the Paillier encryption scheme is based on
the intractability of determining whether an integer r is an
n-residue mod n2, where n is a composite number. In our
protocol, we use the homomorphic properties of the Paillier
cryptosystem to compute in a privacy-preserving fashion the
availability of all users involved in the scheduling process. In
particular, one can verify that the Paillier scheme satisfies
the following:
D[EKP ,r1(m1) · EKP ,r1(m2) mod n2] = m1 +m2 mod n
D[EKP ,r(m1)
m2 mod n2] = m1 ·m2 mod n
where ri, r ∈ Z∗n are random numbers chosen by the en-
crypters, m ∈ Zn is the message to encrypt and n = pq
where p, q are two large primes. The randomness in the en-
cryption ensures that if r1 6= r2, EKP ,r1(m) 6= EKP ,r2(m).
To adapt our scheme to the addition property of Paillier’s
homomorphism, we take the bit value bi,j in the computation
instead of the original bit value bi,j as follows: bi,j = 0 if
bi,j = 1, and bi,j = r (where r ∈ Z∗n, r > 1 is a random
integer) if bi,j = 0.
Scheme
The corresponding privacy-preserving scheduling protocol is
shown in Figure 4. First, all users select the sequence of
time slots according to the permutation σ, i.e., σj , ∀j =
1, . . . ,m, and then encrypt individually the corresponding
availabilities, i.e. Ei = [Ei,σ1 , . . . , Ei,σm ] where Ei,σj =
EKP ,ri,j (bi,σj ). Then, each user sends its Ei privately to
the scheduling server that performs the multiplication and
exponentiation (
∏N
i=1Ei,σj )
R of all users’ encrypted sched-
ules Ei,σj , for j = 1, . . . ,m, in order to obtain the encryption
of the value Vσj that is needed by the users. Afterwards, the
server sends the aggregated encrypted result Esched back to
each user. Each slot in Esched contains a randomly scaled
sum of the individual time-slot bits bi,σj encrypted with the
users’ shared key. Finally, each user decrypts the result and
knows that if Vσj = 0, the time slot σj is available for ev-
erybody. If Vσj > 1, then at least one user is not available.
Note that even if the server chooses R = 1, the privacy of
the users is preserved with bi,j . The following result shows
the correctness and privacy properties of SchedPa.
Lemma 2. The protocol SchedPa is correct and execution
privacy-preserving.
Due to space constraints, we omit the proof of Lemma 2
here. Interested readers can find the proof in the full paper
[8].
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7. SCHEDGM ALGORITHM
In this section, we present our last privacy-preserving schedul-
ing algorithm, which is based on the Goldwasser-Micali (GM)
cryptographic scheme [17]. The security of the GM encryp-
tion relies on the intractability of the quadratic residuosity
problem, i.e. on the infeasibility of determining whether or
not an integer r is a quadratic residue mod n when the Ja-
cobi symbol for r is 1, given n = pq where p, q are large
primes. SchedGM makes use of the following homomorphic
property of the GM cryptosystem:
D[EKP ,r1(m1) · EKP ,r2(m2)] = m1 m2
The intuition behind the protocol is based on the work by
Herlea et al. [18], in which users privately establish a global
bit mask (unknown to any user) and then compare all the
masked availabilities without knowing the true bit value bi,σj
of the other users. If all users have the same masked bit
value for a given time slot σj , then each user knows that
everybody else has the same availability, which can be in-
ferred by looking at the private unmasked bit value bi,σj .
Although initially used in a distributed scenario, we extend
the general idea to the centralized scheme as well.
Assumption
Each user ui generates a private random bit mask si =
[ci,1, ci,2, . . . , ci,m], ci,j ∈ {0, 1}, of the same length of the
schedule xi.
Scheme
The privacy-preserving scheduling algorithm is shown in Fig-
ure 5. Each user first selects the sequence of time slots ac-
cording to the permutation σ, i.e., σj , ∀j = 1, . . . ,m, and
then masks the corresponding schedule bits, i.e. bi,σj =
bi,σj  ci,j . Then, each user encrypts individually both its
bit mask, i.e. Eci = [EKP ,ri,1(ci,1), . . . , EKP ,ri,m(ci,m), and
the masked availabilities, i.e. Ei = [Ei,σ1 , . . . , Ei,σm ], where
Ei,σj = EKP ,ri,j (b

i,σj
). Afterwards, each user ui sends its
Ei and E
c
i to the server, which computes the multiplication
of the received Ei,σj with the encrypted masks of all other
users uk, ∀k 6= i, obtaining Ei,σj = Ei,σj ·∏k 6=iEKP (ck,j),
∀i ∈ 1, . . . , N and ∀j = 1, . . . ,m. Afterwards, the server
sends all individual schedules, masked by a global mask
c1,j  . . .  cN,j , to each user in a random order. As a
result, a user will not know his own schedule (masked with
the global mask), otherwise he would be able to determine
the global mask. Finally, each user decrypts the received
messages and compares all masked individual schedules. If
for a given time slot σj they all have the same value, then
each user ui can infer whether the time slot σj is available
by looking at its own schedule bi,σj . The following result
shows the correctness and privacy properties of SchedGM.
Lemma 3. The protocol SchedGM is correct and server-
private.
8
Figure 6: Frontend of the scheduling application on
a Nokia N810.
Due to space constraints, we omit the proof of Lemma 3
here. Interested readers can find the proof in the full paper
[8].
8. IMPLEMENTATION AND DISCUSSION
Before presenting the implementation details, let us first per-
form a comparative analysis of the asymptotic complexities
of the proposed protocols, as shown in Table 2. In order to
compare our three algorithms with an equivalent security,
we set the bit-lengths of the ElGamal modulus q and the
Paillier and GM modulus n to 1024 bits. A time-slot avail-
ability would then be encrypted to a 2-tuple of 1024-bit ci-
phertexts for ElGamal, to a 1024-bit ciphertext for GM and
to a 2048-bit ciphertext for the Paillier encryption scheme.
From Table 2 we can see that the SchedElG and SchedPa
protocols are very efficient, both in terms of communication
O(m), wherem is the number of time slots, and computation
complexity O(m). Moreover, these two algorithms provide
strong privacy guarantees. SchedGM, on the other hand, is
comparatively less efficient due to the greater number of ex-
changed messages (O(N ·m), where N is the number of par-
ticipants). From the privacy perspective, SchedGM reveals
more information: users can infer the ratio of free/busy par-
ticipants for each time slot without identifying the ones that
are busy and the ones that are free. Because in all schemes,
the server operates only on encrypted data, it cannot gain
any knowledge about the users’ private schedules.
Distributed [24, 18] and hybrid [28] solutions proposed in the
literature are less efficient from the communication stand-
point as compared to the proposed protocols. Moreover,
the computational complexity of these schemes is higher
than SchedElG and SchedPa, and this undermines their ap-
plicability on resource-constrained mobile platforms. Even
though the hybrid approach [28] has comparable computa-
tion complexity, it is not completely reliable from the privacy
point of view because it assumes that the server(s) can get
clear-text access to the individual availabilities.
We further evaluate the performance of SchedElg, SchedPa
and SchedGM by implementing the client component of the
protocols and primitives on Nokia N810 mobile devices with
400 MHz CPU and 128 MB RAM (Figure 6), and the server
component on a desktop computer with 2 GHz CPU and 3
Table 2: Efficiency and privacy of scheduling pro-
tocols (DisCSP [28], MPC-DisCSP2 [24] and SDC
[18])
.
  
Per-user 
encr. 
Per-user 
decr. 
Per-user 
comm. 
Order of an 
encr. availab. 
Privacy 
properties 
C e
n t
r a
l i z
e d
 SchedElG O(m) O(m) O(m) 1024 bits 
User-private  
Server-private 
SchedPa O(m) O(m) O(m) 2048 bits User-private  Server-private 
SchedGM O(m) O(N · m) O(N · m) 1024 bits User-private 
# 
Server-private 
Naïve 0 0 O(m) 1 bit * None 
    
H
y b
r i d
 
DisCSP 
protocol O(m) O(m) O(N · m) 1024 bits Private  
    
D
i s t
r i b
u t
e d
 MPC-
DisCSP2 
protocol 
O(N · m) O(m) O(N · m) 2048 bits Private 
SDC 
protocol O(N
2 · m) O(N · m) O(N · m · log2(N)) 1024 bits Private 
 (*) The naïve algorithm does not encrypt the schedule bits 
 (#) Adv IDT is a negligible function, whereas, for some output Y of the algorithm, Adv LNK is  
                     non-negligible 
 
GB RAM. The results of the experimentation are shown in
Figure 7 and 8.
Client encryption
As we can see from Figure 7, the time required to per-
form the scheduling operations increases with the number
of time slots for all the proposed algorithms, which is intu-
itive. With respect to encryption performance, Figure 7(a)
shows that SchedElg is the most efficient scheduling algo-
rithm, requiring 4 seconds to encrypt 45 time slots (a typ-
ical weekly schedule on a per hour basis). The same task
is accomplished by SchedGM and SchedPa in 7 and 14 sec-
onds respectively. These results might be explained by the
following. First, the cryptographic primitives for the ElGa-
mal scheme are implemented in a standard well-optimized
library, libgcrypt, present in most Unix-based operating sys-
tems. SchedGM, on the contrary, does not use a standard
library. We implemented the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosys-
tem libraries, and as such it is likely that further optimiza-
tion could significantly improve the performance. Second,
the encrypted elements in SchedPa have twice the bit-length
of the ones used in the other two algorithms, and therefore
the same operations (multiplications and exponentiations)
require more time.
Client decryption
Figure 7(b) shows the time required for decrypting the final
result (common availabilities) of the scheduling algorithms
at the client. Similarly to the encryption time, the fastest
algorithm for the decryption is SchedElg, which takes 4 sec-
onds in order to obtain the aggregated availabilities for a
45 time-slot period. For the same number of time slots,
SchedPa takes approx. 7 seconds, which is almost twice the
best performance. The decryption times for both SchedElg
and SchedPa are independent of the number of participants.
The performance of SchedGM, due to the fact that the fi-
nal output of the algorithm is a sequence of vectors instead
of just a single aggregated vector, is decreasing with the
number of users as well as with the number of time slots.
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Figure 7: Client implementation performance.
Thus, for a reasonable number of participants (e.g. N = 5),
SchedGM is still practical enough to be implemented on
resource-constrained mobile devices, although it is not the
preferred solution.
Client communication
Figure 7(c) shows the (application layer) data that each
client exchanges during one execution of the scheduling al-
gorithm. In general, all the proposed privacy-preserving
scheduling algorithms have reasonable communication costs.
SchedElg and SchedPa are the most efficient algorithms and
they require 22 kB of data in order to compute the aggre-
gated availabilities of a 45 time-slot period, whereas SchedGM
requires 39 kB for the same result. As previously mentioned,
SchedGM uses a sequence of masked vectors in order to com-
pute the final availabilities of the users, and therefore the
amount of data is proportional both to the number of users
and time-slots.
Server performance
The scheduling server’s performance is shown in Figure 8.
As it can be seen, the time required to perform the schedul-
ing operations on encrypted values increases with both the
number of users and time slots, which is intuitive. Even with
a large number of users and time slots, the amount of time
required for the operations is still below 0.2 second, which
suggests that the load on the server is limited, which allows
it to efficiently handle multiple scheduling events, without
incurring in huge computational overhead.
9. EXTENSIONS
In this section, we show how SchedPa can be easily extended
to the case where user schedules are non-binary, i.e., each
time slot is a non-negative cost Ci,j that indicates ui’s pref-
erence for time-slot j. We also describe several active at-
tacks on the proposed scheduling schemes, such as collusion
between users-server and data modification by the users,
and how these attacks can be mitigated by using existing
cryptographic mechanisms. Finally, we discuss some further
enhancements for the privacy of users’ schedules and how to
implement them.
9.1 Non-binary Schedules
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Figure 8: Server processing performance.
The goal here is to find, in a privacy-preserving fashion, the
time-slot with the minimum aggregated cost. The scheme
works as follows:
1. Each user ui reorders its cost sequence Ci,1 . . . Ci,m
using the shared permutation σ and encrypts each
cost Ci,σj in the sequence using the Paillier cryptosys-
tem with the shared group key KP . It then passes
the result (EKP ,ri,1(Ci,σ1) . . . EKP ,ri,m(Ci,σm)) to the
server.
2. The server computes the encrypted sum of costs EKP ,rj (R·∑N
i=1 Ci,σj ), ∀j, where R is a random integer greater
than one chosen by the server.
3. The server selects a pre-determined user uk and passes
a randomly ordered (different from σ) sequence of the
encrypted aggregated costs to it. This is to prevent uk
from learning the aggregated cost function.
4. User uk decrypts all the elements passed from the
server, and identifies the minimum aggregated cost.
5. User uk then queries the server for the index of the (en-
10
crypted) minimum aggregated cost. The server then
distributes the queried index to all users.
It can be easily shown that the above scheme is execution
privacy-preserving. For conciseness, we do not discuss the
details of the privacy analysis here.
9.2 Active Attacks
There are five kinds of possible active attacks on the schedul-
ing schemes: (i) collusion between the scheduling server and
users, (ii) collusion among users, (iii) fake user generation
by the server, (iv) individual user schedule modification and
(v) integrity and replay attacks.
In order to thwart the first issue, the invited participants
could agree on establishing a shared secret using techniques
from threshold cryptography, such as [26]. The server should
then collude with at least a predefined number of partic-
ipants in order to obtain the shared secret and learn the
individual availabilities. The second concern may arise if k
colluding users set their schedules to all-available, and try
to learn the schedules of other users. Assuming that N is
the total number of participants and k the number of col-
luding ones, our schemes would provide some level of sched-
ule privacy to honest users as long as N − k ≥ 2. Only if
all but one users collude, then they are able to determine
the schedule of the remaining user. In order for the third
attack to succeed, the server would need to generate fake
users and convince the true participants about the legiti-
macy of the fake users. In practice, this is a non-trivial task
to achieve, and thus the attack has a very slim chance of
succeeding. Moreover, the effectiveness of such attack could
be further reduced by adopting the threshold cryptographic
scheme mentioned previously, because the server would then
need to generate k fake users and validate them as true par-
ticipants.
The fourth attack is also not able to succeed in revealing
the availability of other meeting participants, as the best
a malicious user can do is to set its own schedule to all-
available, and then guess the availabilities of the other N−1
participants. Even if a malicious user attempts to modify
its own schedule with invalid values, such as negative val-
ues, the message domain restrictions of cryptosystems (such
as ElGamal and Paillier) would prevent such modifications.
Thus, malicious attacks consisting of manipulating the final
result by using invalid negative values as schedule values are
not possible in the proposed protocols.
The last attack concerns the integrity and freshness of the
encrypted schedules. The participants are the only entities
in the system that know the secret that has been used to
generate the public/private key pair, and therefore they are
the only ones that can generate and verify the integrity of
the encrypted data. Moreover, using the shared common
secret, each participant could generate a fresh nonce at each
algorithm execution and send it (in encrypt form) to the
server during the scheduling process. The server would then
forward these encrypted nonces to each participant, who
could verify that all received nonces are equal. If not all
nonces are equal, then the participants know that there has
been at least one replay attack, and thus the schedule results
are not to be trusted.
9.3 Single Available Time Slot
The output of conventional, not privacy-preserving schedul-
ing services (such as Doodle [3] or Outlook [5]) consists of
time slots in which all participating users are available. The
proposed schemes follow this paradigm and they provide,
in an efficient and privacy-preserving way, all time-slots for
which all users are available.
In some cases, however, it might be desirable to limit the
disclosure of common availabilities to only one time-slot, in-
stead of the set of all available time-slots. This would pro-
vide an additional layer of privacy for the individual sched-
ules, as the participants would be given a single feasible
solution. Hereafter we describe one simple way to adapt the
proposed schemes to support this feature (Figure 9).
First, all users participating in the scheduling process per-
form step 1 of the respective algorithm (SchedElg, SchedPa
or SchedGM ). Second, the server performs step 2 but it
does not send the final output to each user. Instead, it
randomly chooses a private time-slot permutation function
θ = [θ1, . . . , θm] and applies it to the elements of the final
output vector(s) Esched. We call this new vector(s) E
θ
sched.
At this point, the schedules have been permuted twice, once
by the users prior to the encryptions (with σ) and once by
the server (with θ).
Next, the server sends Eθsched to the user who started the
activity scheduling (the initiator), which then gets the com-
mon availabilities but in a doubly permuted order. The
initiator is able to determine the available slots in this dou-
bly permuted time slot list, but he is not able to determine
the time slots they correspond to in the original schedule.
The initiator selects one commonly available time slot θk
and securely sends the index θk to the server. Fourth, the
server (i) replaces all availabilities other than θk in E
θ
sched
with random numbers, (ii) reverts the permutation θ, and
(iii) sends this new vector(s) Eˆsched to each user. Finally,
each user decrypts and reverts the initial permutation σ of
the received vector(s) and determines which time slot j is
the only commonly available time slot.
This simple solution that reveals only a single available time
slot to all the participants involves one extra message ex-
change between the initiator and the scheduling server, as
shown in step 3 of Figure 9. Although the permutation θ
performed by the server preempts the initiator from knowing
the true common availabilities, he might still want to ma-
liciously modify the permuted availabilities. However, the
only action the initiator can do is to choose one of the per-
muted time slots and communicate its index θk to the server,
as it is the server who will then revert the permutation θ and
send the final vector(s) Eˆsched to all users.
10. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Activity scheduling applications are increasingly used by
people on-the-move to efficiently and securely manage their
time. In addition to privacy, which is paramount, such ser-
vices should also be practical and feasible to implement,
given the client-server paradigm that most providers are
using. In this paper, we have provided a framework for
the formal study of privacy properties in such applications,
and we have proposed three novel privacy-preserving pro-
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Figure 9: Extended algorithm scheme for revealing a single available time slot.
tocols that, in addition to guaranteeing privacy, are more
efficient than similar solutions in terms of computation and
communication complexities. Moreover, the implementation
and extensive performance evaluation on real mobile devices
showed that our privacy-preserving schemes are well suited
to practical network architectures and services.
As part of our future work, we intend to further optimize
the implementation of the proposed scheduling algorithms
for performance on mobile devices, and to include user pref-
erences and security related features described in the previ-
ous section. We also plan to release the source code of the
proposed scheduling schemes to the general public under the
GPL licence.
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